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Abstract Complementors accumulate reputation on an
ever-increasing number of online platforms. While the
effects of reputation within individual platforms are wellunderstood, its potential effectiveness across platform
boundaries has received much less attention. This research
note considers complementors’ ability to increase their
trustworthiness in the eyes of prospective consumers by
importing reputational data from another platform. The
study evaluates this potential lever by means of an online
experiment, during which specific combinations of on-site
and imported rating scores are tested. Results reveal that
importing reputation can be advantageous – but also
detrimental, depending on ratings’ values. Implications for
complementors, platform operators, and regulatory bodies
concerned with online reputation are considered.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a flourishing of multi-sided market
platforms, for instance, in the domains of accommodation
sharing, mobility services, and crowd work. These digital
platforms penetrate all levels of economic activity (‘‘platformization’’), shaping the way in which individuals consume and provide services and products (De Reuver et al.
2018; Hein et al. 2020; Van Alstyne et al. 2016b). While
reputation is a crucial instrument for complementors (e.g.,
sellers, drivers, hosts) to attract demand, the reputation they
have built on one platform is, as of today, of limited use
across platform boundaries. As noted by Constantinides
et al. (2018), current reputation systems ‘‘create an entry
barrier for [those] who have not yet established a reputation’’ on a particular platform – a phenomenon also known
as the ‘‘cold-start’’ problem (Kokkodis and Ipeirotis 2016;
Wessel et al. 2017). A potential approach to overcoming
this issue is reputation portability. Reputation portability
refers to the idea of leveraging existing reputation from one
platform by using it as a trust signal on another (Hesse and
Teubner 2020; Teubner et al. 2019).1 For example, consider an Airbnb host looking into posting listings on a
competing platform such as Homestay.com (Constantinides et al. 2018). Rather than re-building reputation from
scratch, portability would allow the complementor to
import their reputational history from the incumbent platform as a credential vis-à-vis prospective guests.
The concept of cross-platform reputation portability and
its potential benefits have already been discussed in the
1

Note that the concept of reputation portability requires delineation
from the more general notion of data portability under GDPR Art. 20.
Reputational data is (as of August 2021) not considered to fall under
this regulation.
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early stages of platformization (Resnick et al. 2000).
However, as of today, large-scale use of reputational data
across platform boundaries has not been observed.2 The
European Commission noted this lack of integration as
problematic due to its potential to hinder platform competition and calls for research on means, benefits, and the
underlying mechanisms of reputation portability (European
Commission 2016, 2017, 2018). Looking at crowd work
platforms, the German government has gone even further
and actively advocated for worker reputation to be made
portable (BMAS 2020; Lambrecht and Heil 2020). However, only little scholarly work has investigated the effects
of transferring reputation across platform boundaries
(Teubner et al. 2019). Hence, despite building momentum
at national and European levels, a scientifically-grounded
understanding of the potential risks and boundary conditions of reputation portability is lacking. However, such
insights are crucial for building further knowledge in the
area of reputation portability and leaves complementors,
platforms, and regulatory bodies with limited guidance
when it comes to decision- and policy making.
First empirical evidence shows that imported reputation
in the form of an excellent rating (e.g., ‘‘5 stars’’) can serve
as an effective signal to stimulate consumers’ trust, particularly when the source and target platforms operate in
the same application context (Otto et al. 2018; Teubner
et al. 2020). Being able to import existing rating from one
platform to another could be appealing for complementors
interested in operating on several platforms (‘‘multi-homing’’). However, there is currently no research available on
whether the trust-promoting effect of imported reputation
extends to other-than-excellent ratings and, if so, to what
extent this is constrained by an existing on-site rating.
Without shedding light on these potential boundary conditions, it is unclear for which combinations imported
ratings could be effective and whether complementors
would actually benefit from importing their reputational
data.
To address this gap, we investigate how different levels
of on-site and imported ratings drive evaluations of complementors’ trustworthiness in the eyes of prospective
consumers and how ratings from different platforms
interact. To do so, we conceptualize a model that captures
the trust effects of different imported and on-site reputation
2

Note that several notable exceptions exist. The e-commerce
platforms TrueGether.com and Bonanza.com (* 40,000 sellers
globally and 25 million items) allow sellers to import reputational
data from eBay and Amazon (Bonanza 2019; TrueGether 2019).
While Bonanza translates eBay ratings into its own 5-star scheme,
TrueGether also allows for the import and display of written
feedback. Moreover, Airbnb supports the export of users’ reputation
by providing a ready-to-use HTML code snippet that complementors
can display on other websites.

123

combinations. We conduct an online experiment to estimate the model’s parameters and explore under which
circumstances complementors could benefit from importing a rating. Our results provide insights into the boundary
conditions of the trust-promoting effects of imported ratings. Based on this, we consider theoretical and practical
implications for complementors, platform operators, and
regulatory bodies.

2 Related Work and Theoretical Background
As of 2021, reputation portability has not been widely
adopted in practice (with notable exceptions as stated
above). Yet, calls for research on the matter have repeatedly occurred in academic literature for almost two decades. Further, over the past five years, there has been
increasing political pressure on platforms to make reputation portable. In the early days of e-commerce, Resnick
et al. (2000) stated that the lack of reputation portability is
problematic as ‘‘[l]imited distribution of feedback limits its
effectiveness’’ (p. 48). Interestingly, in the mid-1990s,
Amazon allowed customers to import existing eBay ratings, and the latter threatened to press charges claiming
these ratings to be proprietary content (Dellarocas et al.
2009; Resnick et al. 2000). About a decade later with more
platforms emerging and the advent of the sharing economy,
Dellarocas et al. (2009) made a case for portable reputation: ‘‘the absence or limited portability results in a substantial exit barrier [which] prevents honest sellers to freely
enter in other markets’’ (p. 468). The notion of managing
online reputation by connecting profiles across platforms
has since been picked up regularly (Botsman 2012; Gans
2018; Puschmann and Alt 2016). These calls unanimously
assume that the trust-building potential of online ratings
also applies to imported ones.
From a theoretical perspective, this research draws upon
signaling theory to conceptualize ‘‘imported’’ reputation as
a deliberate device for complementors to signal trustworthiness (Mavlanova et al. 2012; Spence 1973). Similar to
the theory’s original application in economics (educational
track records on the job market), imported ratings are
‘‘observable characteristics attached to the individual that
are subject to manipulation by him [or her]’’ (Spence
1973). Moreover, building and maintaining a ‘‘good’’
reputation is costly (Dunham 2011) – particularly when
doing so on several platforms. Several recent studies have
leveraged signaling theory as an underpinning for reputation portability. Kokkodis and Ipeirotis (2016) studied the
predictive power of signals for future performance across
job categories (within the confines of the crowd work
platform oDesk). Considering a cross-platform signaling
scenario, Otto et al. (2018) found that ride-sharing
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consumers exhibited higher willingness to pay and trust
towards potential drivers if those drivers’ Airbnb ratings
were available (using a fixed 4.0 star rating). Teubner et al.
(2020) confirmed the trust-building potential of importing
star ratings (a fixed 5.0-star rating) across three common
application areas (accommodation sharing, ride/mobility
services, commodity exchange) and identified fit between
source and target context as a driver of this effect. However, the authors note that the existing studies neither
consider (1) the availability of both on-site and imported
rating simultaneously nor do they (2) account for varying
or sub-standard rating scores.

relationship captures the association between rating and trustworthiness. If both on-site and imported ratings exist (4), we
allow for interaction between ratings (d4 ). A pair-wise comparison of all four cases results in several decision boundaries
depending on the availability of rating scores r e and r i . First, to
decide whether to import a rating of r i if no on-site rating r e is
available, the complementor compares cases (1) and (3).
Equating and solving for r i yields the import threshold
a1  a3
:
ð2Þ
ri [ r  ¼
c3
Thus, the complementor will import an incumbent rating
if it is greater than r  . Second, if an on-site rating exists,
comparing cases (2) and (4) yields4

3 Reputation Portability Scenario and Hypotheses
Consider a multi-homing complementor who has an existing
track record on an incumbent platform (i) and has additionally
started to operate on an entrant platform (e). Reputation on both
platforms is conceptualized as a rating score ranging between
1.0 and 5.0 stars (i.e., the most common system). The complementor has acquired a rating of r i on the incumbent platform
and may (or may not) have already acquired an on-site rating of
r e on the entrant platform. We consider the complementor’s
signaling decision, that is, whether to import their rating r i from
the incumbent to the entrant platform. The stylized function
f ðr e ; r i Þ describes the relation between the complementor’s
(on-site and imported) rating scores and their trustworthiness in
the eyes of prospective consumers. To be able to account for
their individual and interactive effects, the two ratings r e and r i
are not conflated into a single score but displayed separately.
This yields four conceptual cases: (1) no on-site rating exists
and no rating is imported; (2) on-site rating r e exists and no
rating is imported; (3) no on-site rating exists and a rating r i is
imported; (4) on-site rating r e exists and a rating r i is imported.
The ‘‘trust function’’ f ðr e ; r i Þ can hence be formalized as
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r i [ r  ðr e Þ ¼

ða2  a4 Þ þ ðb2  b4 Þr e
c 4 þ d4 r e

ð3Þ

Building on the results of extant literature on on-site
reputation and the emerging work on reputation portability,
we consider on-site and imported ratings as signals for the
complementor’s trustworthiness from the consumer’s perspective. Indeed, as previous research has shown, ‘‘good’’
on-site reputation is an effective trust signal in online
transactions (Dellarocas et al. 2009; Qiu et al. 2018;
Tadelis 2016). Also, a high imported rating can facilitate
consumer trust in the complementor (Otto et al. 2018;
Teubner et al. 2020). Yet, existing work has neither considered the effectiveness of different rating values, nor the
interplay of on-site and imported ratings in promoting trust.
Based on the overarching theoretical framing of (crossplatform) signaling and previous work, we argue that
imported ratings operate similarly to on-site ratings in that
higher imported rating scores will, ceteris paribus, yield
higher trustworthiness. Importantly, however, this does not
imply that importing a rating will always be beneficial
compared to not displaying any rating at all.

ð1Þ

where the parameter vectors a; b; c; d capture the effects of the
rating scores r e and r i on the complementor’s trustworthiness
across the four cases (j ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4).3 For the first case (1), a
single coefficient a1 suffices. For the cases, in which either an
on-site rating (2) or an imported rating (3) exists, a linear
3
Please note that f j ðr e ; r i Þ represents a conceptual function here and
not a regression. We hence do not include residual/ error terms in this
representation.

H1 The trust-promoting effect of an imported rating is
driven by the rating’s value (c3 [ 0).
Importantly, as captured by case (4), a complementor may
not only have an imported rating but also an on-site rating.
This raises the question of how the consumer will respond to
4

As opposed to r  , note that r  is not a constant but a function of the
on-site rating.
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the availability of two (potentially different) ratings.
According to signaling theory, the availability of two ratings
requires the consumer to assess two different signals for the
same quality (i.e., trustworthiness). Both signals are meaningful in the sense that maintaining a good reputation on
either platform is costly for the complementor. Hence, it
would not be reasonable for the consumer to disregard either
of the two signals. At the same time, it is the nature of signals
that they are ‘‘inherently noisy’’ and serve as an indicator for
the signaled quality rather than as proof (de Haan et al. 2011).
Thus, in the presence of two signals (rather than one), either
one renders the respective other more reliable. While it is not
clear, ex ante, whether both signals will receive similar
weighting by the consumer, we expect that an improvement
in one rating has a – ceteris paribus – positive effect on the
trust-building effect of the respective other. In other words,
we hypothesize a positive interaction d4 between the on-site
and imported rating scores.
H2 The trust-promoting effect of an imported rating is
stronger for higher values of the on-site rating – and vice
versa (d4 [ 0).

4 Method
To test our hypotheses and estimate the outlined trust
function’s parameters, we conducted an online experiment.
The main dependent variable was prospective consumers’
trust in the displayed complementor. We systematically
varied the complementor’s on-site and imported ratings in
terms of availability (yes/no) and, provided that the rating
was available, its value.
4.1 Procedure and Sample
We recruited 500 participants using Prolific.co, which has
been praised for its data quality, subject diversity, and option
to pre-screen participants (Palan and Schitter 2018; Peer et al.
2017). We pre-filtered participants so that they had at least
some experience in online shopping and to represent a gender-diverse and multi-national subject pool. Respondents
opted in for participation, received 0.80£ upon successful
completion, and took an average time of 74 s to complete the
experiment. Seven of 500 participants timed out and were
excluded from further analysis. The final sample hence
included 493 participants (age between 18 and 73 years;
mean = 35.0, median = 32; 55.6% female).
4.2 Stimulus Material
Participants took the role of consumers and decided on
booking a stay with a complementor on the fictional
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accommodation platform Happystay.com (Appendix A;
available online via http://link.springer.com).
4.3 Treatment Design
Following a 2 9 2 between-subjects design, each participant
experienced only one of the four scenarios outlined in the
following. The displayed complementor either had no on-site
rating (cases 1 and 3) or a rating r e (randomly drawn from
{1.0, 1.5, …, 5.0}; cases 2 and 4). Additionally, as outlined
above, the complementor had either imported a rating r i from
the incumbent platform (again, randomly drawn from {1.0,
1.5, …, 5.0}) or no rating was imported. All possible combinations of rating scores were tested where the distribution
was informed by the skewed values observed on actual
platforms (Schoenmueller et al. 2018). Thus, although ratings
above 3.0 stars occurred more frequently, the allocation of
participants across cases (1) to (4) was mainly driven by the
number of possible rating combinations per condition and by
ensuring that at least a couple of observations were obtained
for each possible combination. Besides rating scores, we also
varied the number of ratings the complementor had received
(ranging from lower single-digits to high double-digits) as a
control variable. The allocation of participants across the
treatment conditions and specific rating scores is reported in
Appendix B.
4.4 Measurement
As the main dependent variable, we surveyed participants’
trust in the complementor (Gefen 2002). Moreover, we
controlled for participants’ trust in the incumbent platform,
their general trusting disposition (Gefen 2000), and, additionally, individual risk-affinity (Dohmen et al. 2011). All
variables were measured on single-item 11-point Likert
scales. Descriptive statistics on the participant-specific
controls and the measurement instrument are provided in
Appendices B and C. Complementary analysis reported in
Appendix B confirmed that there were no systematic differences in participants’ demographics across treatments.

5 Results
5.1 Trust-building Effect of Imported Reputation (H1)
We conducted a set of OLS regressions to estimate the
parameters a; b; c; and d of the trust function as specified in (1).
Table 1 reports the results for all four cases (1–4). The dependent variable (trust in complementor) was standardized to the
interval [0, 1]. Rating scores range from 1.0 to 5.0 (stars).
The results are illustrated in Fig. 1a (left; cases 1, 2 and 3)
and Fig. 1b (right; cases 2 and 4), respectively. First, if no on-
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Table 1 Parameter estimates; OLS regressions; standard errors in parentheses
DV: Trust in complementor

Constant

Case (1) (no rating)

Case (2) (on-site only)

Case (3) (imported only)

Case (4) (both ratings)

0.350*** (0.038)

- 0.004 (.075)

0.016 (0.082)

0.259 *(0.116)

On-site Rating

0.128*** (.021)

- 0.029 (0.032)

Imported Rating

0.116*** (0.023)

- 0.006 (0.033)

Interaction

0.024** (0.009)

Observations

24

81

83

305

Adjusted R2

–

0.308

0.237

0.181

***p \ 0.001; **p \ 0.01; *p \ 0.05

(a)

(b)
Rating Type
None (1)
Imported rating(s) (4)

On-site only (2)
Imported only (3)

(2)
(3)
(1)
1.0 stars

Fig. 1 Consumer trust in complementor by rating score; (a) cases (1), (2), and (3); (b) cases (2) and (4)

site rating exists, complementors benefit from importing any
 2:9 stars (i.e., the
rating score larger than r  ¼ :350:016
:116
intersection point of cases (1) and (3) in Fig. 1a). Note that in
Fig. 1a, case (1) also intersects case (2) at around 2.75 stars,
meaning that it is preferable to not have any rating at all on the
entrant platform rather than a ‘‘bad’’ rating.5

Result 1 In the absence of an on-site rating, consumers’
trust in complementors is driven by increasing values of the
imported rating ( r i ). However, importing a rating will only
be beneficial if its value is sufficiently high. Otherwise, it
will be detrimental for the complementor.
5.2 Interplay of On-site and Imported Reputation (H2)

5

Of course, these values can only have indicative character and
hence their interpretation requires caution. Complementors will need
to carefully consider the characteristics and rating distributions on the
respective platforms. To provide an empirical basis for our reasoning,
we collected additional data on users’ general perceptions about
rating score distributions across a variety of platforms (Appendix D).
The data show that users perceive rating distributions quite similarly
across platforms (average correlation r ¼.928). This perceived
similarity supports our reasoning in the sense that a rating on
platform A does not mean something completely different than a
similar rating on platform B.

Second, when both on-site and imported ratings are
available (i.e., case 4), these two signals interact (d4 =0.024,
p \ 0.01) in that the trust effect of on-site ratings increases
with better imported ratings – and vice versa. Figure 1b
shows this relation for different values of imported star
ratings. Based on this, we can estimate the import threshold
as a function of the on-site rating r e , yielding
e
r  ¼ :263þ:157r
:006þ:024re . This function is shown in Fig. 2a and
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Fig. 2 a Estimated import threshold; b Estimated reputation resetting threshold. These thresholds have to be taken with caution as they depend
on factors such as the employed sample, the ratings’ scales, as well as consumers’ perceptions of the rating distributions on the respective
platforms

illustrates the complementor’s decision boundary for
whether or not to import a rating (r i ; y-axis) from the
incumbent platform in case they have to weigh it against an
existing on-site rating (r e ; x-axis).
Result 2 When an on-site rating is available, the decision
threshold for importing a rating depends on the on-site
rating’s value. This relation is positive and concave.
Figure 2a demonstrates some of the intricacies of the
complementor’s situation. First, the ratings are neither
additive nor (perfect) substitutes. One rating’s effect
depends on the other rating’s availability and its value –
and vice versa. This implies, for instance, that complementors may find it advantageous to import a 3.5 or 4.0 star
rating when starting on a new platform (on which they have
not gathered any reputation yet). However, the very same
imported rating can become a burden once they have
obtained sufficiently high on-site ratings.
5.3 Reputation Resetting
Another way to look at the outlined scenario is to consider
‘‘reputation resetting’’, that is, resetting the complementor’s track record on the entrant platform. Complementors
with sub-standard reviews may decide to give up their
entrant platform account and create a new one. If no option
for importing a rating from an incumbent platform is
available, the estimated threshold for considering reputation resetting is equal to the above-mentioned intersection
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between cases (1) and (2), i.e., at r  ¼ a1ba2  2:75 stars.
2

Hence, if a complementor’s rating drops below this critical
value, reputation resetting becomes beneficial. However, if
importing a rating is an option, the trigger for resetting will
depend on this available (to-be-imported) rating and may
be substantially higher. Specifically, a complementor could
benefit from abandoning their account if
r e \r  ðr i Þ ¼

ða3  a4 Þ þ ðc3  c4 Þr i
;
b 4 þ d4 r i

ð4Þ

Figure 2b depicts this relationship, indicating the rating
combinations for which reputation resetting becomes
viable based on our data. As can be seen in Fig. 2b, when
the best possible incumbent rating is available, resetting
becomes viable for any on-site rating below (as high as) 4.0
stars. Enabling reputation import may thus (inadvertently)
promote resetting strategies as the ‘‘drop height’’ for
complementors become smaller. This may, in turn, create
new issues and necessitate additional, preventive measures
on the part of platform operators and policy makers. We
provide an overview of all combinations of reputation
import and reputation resetting in Appendix E.
5.4 Control Variable Analysis and Robustness Checks
Extending scenario (4) in Table 1 by control variables
shows that even though trust in the incumbent platform
(b ¼ :014; p\:05), general disposition to trust (b ¼ 0:029;
p\0:001), risk-affinity (b ¼ 0:031; p\0:001), and online
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shopping experience (b ¼ 0:007; p [ :05) have significant trust effects, the main coefficients are not substantially
affected (the same holds for the other scenarios; Appendix
F). Further, we conducted robustness checks for the interaction of star rating score and number of reviews received,
as the latter may strengthen the effects of good/bad rating
scores (positivity/negativity effects; Khare et al. 2011) and
previous research suggested a positive relation between
number of reviews and trust (Cabral and Hortaçsu 2010;
Qiu et al. 2018). However, neither the number of reviews
nor their log-transformed values had significant effects
(Appendix F). As an additional supplementary analysis, we
investigated potential gender effects. In particular, we
analyzed how evaluations of trust were affected when, both
host and potential guest had the same gender or when a
female guest was presented with a male host profile. None
of these variables had any significant effect (Appendix F).
As a further check to account for the different sample sizes
across the treatment cells in case (4) ({1.0, 1.5, …,
5.0} 9 {1.0, 1.5, …, 5.0}), we repeated the analysis using
the data on an aggregated cell-level. This also indicated
robustness.

6 Discussion
The increasing market power of platforms has led to a
rediscovery of the idea of reputation portability (European
Commission 2017). Given the fact that a majority of users
are active across multiple platforms (Teubner et al. 2019),
we expect the concept of reputation portability to draw
increasing attention – both from commercial and political
stakeholders (BMAS 2020; Lambrecht and Heil 2020).
With this research note, we seek to contribute to the
ongoing debate on the nature and scope of reputation
portability within the online platform economy. While this
concept has been touted since the early 2000s, it is striking
that, thus far, it has experienced only limited proliferation.
Furthermore, as of 2021, only few platforms enable the
import of ratings. Hence, reputation portability can currently be described, at best, as a niche application. However, given recent political advances for strengthening user
rights and data portability (including reputational data;
BMAS 2020), and the all-pervasiveness of platforms across
many industries (Alt and Zimmermann 2014; De Reuver
et al. 2018; Sundararajan 2016), we provide insights into
the prospective implications of reputation portability for
complementors, incumbents, and entrant platforms. After
all, stipulations on cross-platform reputation should consider how complementors may actually use the
functionality.
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6.1 Theoretical Implications
Based on consumer evaluations of complementors’ trustworthiness, our study considered the trust-building capabilities of importing an external rating. In line with nascent
work on cross-platform signaling (Otto et al. 2018; Teubner et al. 2020), our results show that, overall, imported
reputation operates similarly to on-site reputation in that
higher imported ratings yield higher levels of trust (H1). At
first glance, this might not seem particularly surprising.
However, it is important to note that, thus far, academic
research has only investigated the influence of high
imported ratings without considering the role of different
rating levels (Otto et al. 2018; Teubner et al. 2020). Hence,
the required quality of imported reputation for an impact on
trust had not been evident. We find that in the absence of an
on-site rating, an imported rating operates as a facilitator of
trust but that it can also be detrimental if its score is too
low.
Moreover, our findings show that an interaction between
complementors’ on-site and imported rating on trust occurs
(H2). This is an important extension on the literature on
cross-platform signaling, as previous studies on reputation
imports have considered only scenarios without on-site
ratings (Otto et al. 2018; Teubner et al. 2020). As can be
seen in the interaction of ratings (Fig. 2), an imported
rating can have a positive or a negative impact on complementors’ trustworthiness depending on the existence
(and value) of an on-site rating. Hence, we demonstrate
that there are limits to the positive effects of reputation
import and that, depending on the specific scores, different
trust-maximizing plans of action emerge. In other words, a
complementor’s decision of whether or not to employ the
additional signal by importing a rating needs to be considered in view of both ratings’ values.
6.2 Practical Implications
Our study also has several implications for users, platforms, and regulators. It is often argued that consumers
and/or complementors could benefit from reputation
portability. The European Commission (2018), for
instance, highlights explicitly that users would appreciate
cross-platform access to data such as ratings and reviews.
As of today, however, complementors face a cold-start
problem when beginning to operate on a new platform
(Kokkodis and Ipeirotis 2016; Wessel et al. 2017). Therefore, being stuck at zero ratings is a critical issue, especially for complementors considering multi-homing
(Dellarocas et al. 2009). Further, prior research suggests
that it is difficult for new complementors who have just
joined a new platform to collect good ratings. These new
complementors often find themselves competing with more
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established complementors who have already built a track
record (Gutt and Herrmann 2015; Resnick et al. 2006). Our
findings show that these complementors can benefit from
importing reputation by increasing their trustworthiness in
the eyes of prospective consumers. Even for established
complementors (i.e., those who already have an on-site
rating at their disposal), higher trustworthiness enables
them to attract more demand and/or realize price premiums
(Tadelis 2016). Hence, reputation portability addresses a
relevant issue and can benefit complementors both in early
stages and in the long run. For complementors, our findings
provide guidance when making deciding about whether or
not to import reputation.
Reputation portability is a two-way street; research must
distinguish between the two directions. From a strategic
perspective, neither incumbent nor entrant platforms have
an incentive to offer the export of their (users’) data. This
data represents a competitive lever for incumbent platforms
due to data network effects; incumbents may thus not be
willing to cede this strategic advantage (Gregory et al.
2020; Tucker 2019). On the contrary, it is to be expected
that they will (actively) inhibit the exploitation of their
users’ reputation outside the platform (Krämer 2018).6 Due
to the market power of platforms such as Airbnb and Uber
– and given that their reputation is constrained to these
platforms, complementors effectively find themselves
locked-in. This, in turn, represents an entry barrier for new
(i.e., entrant) platforms (Gans 2018; Van Alstyne et al.
2016a). However, in order to innovate and benefit from
additional activity on their platform, incumbents need to
consider the trade-offs between seclusion and openness
(Parker and Van Alstyne 2018). In this sense,
portable reputation could affect the interplay of complementors, incumbents, and entrant platforms – mitigating
lock-in, facilitating multi-homing, and increasing platform
competition. From a consumer protection perspective,
stipulating the right to reputation portability (a path that
first governments have proposed to follow), hence appears
consequential.
While platforms remain hesitant to enable users to export their reputational data, a different picture emerges for
reputation imports. In fact, as highlighted above, examples
for reputation imports do exist: the e-commerce platforms
TrueGether.com and Bonanza.com allow sellers to import
ratings and reviews from eBay and Amazon (Bonanza
2019; TrueGether 2019). For regulators, our study thus
provides further evidence that reputation portability can
have a positive impact on trust in online environments and
that there is a rationale for complementors to make use of
their pre-existing ratings from other platforms.
6

Note that Airbnb, however, does offer the aforementioned code
snippet which, in a way, can be seen (and used) as an export function.
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However, unintended consequences of enabling reputation portability may also arise. For instance, as we have
shown, allowing for rating imports may facilitate strategies
of reputation resetting – which could potentially be
employed by complementors, repeatedly abandoning
accounts to exploit consumers. Moreover, as market power
of already dominant complementors would extend beyond
their home turf to hitherto ‘‘unconnected’’ niche markets,
demand concentration may further increase. In addition, it
is well-conceivable that reputation imports would be
selective to some extent and that such ‘‘cherry-picking’’
could lead to a further rating inflation. Moreover, it is
conceivable that reputation portability may exacerbate
rather than mitigate the cold-start problem, as well-established complementors will be able to take along their
reputation as well – making it even harder to complete
against them, even on newer or smaller platforms. Finally,
fake reviews may propagate faster and wider under reputation portability, undermining the reliability of (and hence
trust in) platforms and reputation systems as a whole. It
would be a challenge for platforms and policy makers to
anticipate such non-intended side effects of reputation
portability. Potential means to mitigate such issues could
be platform governance and control mechanisms (e.g.,
allowing for imports only from a set of carefully curated
source platforms).
6.3 Limitations and Future Work
Naturally, the present study has limitations. First, the outlined scenario remains somewhat hypothetical as only few
platforms actually allow for reputation imports. Nevertheless, research on the subject is needed in order to establish
a foundation of knowledge which complementors, platforms, and regulatory authorities can build upon – especially in view of the repeated calls for reputation portability
by political bodies (BMAS 2020; European Commission
2016, 2017, 2018). Moreover, our study can only offer a
limited view into the complexity of actual platform interactions. The stylized experimental design is limited in
providing a basic stimulus – stripped of other design elements typically encountered in the field (e.g., profile photos, self-descriptions; Dann et al. 2020; Teubner et al.
2021). While this setting provides a suitable test bed to
study the anticipated relation of (imported) reputation and
trust, actual behavior will likely be influenced by additional
factors not accounted for in this research.
Next, the thresholds estimated in this study need to be
considered with caution. In this sense, neither are these
thresholds immediately generalizable to other platforms
nor do we suggest using the estimates as the basis for
mechanistic decisions by complementors. The estimated
import thresholds emerge as an illustrative example of the
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boundary conditions for complementors’ import decisions.
As noted earlier, the specific boundaries need to take into
consideration the circumstances and rating distributions of
the respective platforms. Future work may study how the
effectiveness of imported ratings differs for different platforms, rating distributions, and consumer perceptions
thereof.
Additionally, we did not find conclusive evidence for
the role of the number of ratings for trust-building. While
prior research has suggested a positive relation between the
number of ratings and trust, it is important that these
findings were constrained to good/excellent ratings only
(Cabral and Hortaçsu 2010; Qiu et al. 2018). By contrast,
our study deliberately employs a balanced design in which
the entire scale from 1.0 to 5.0 stars is used, that is, also
including the lowest possible rating scores. For such low
scores, a higher rating count may have negative trust
effects. While our data does not allow for clear-cut conclusions on this interaction (see Table F2 in Appendix F),
future work may want to explore these relations in greater
detail.
Further, we considered reputation portability within the
same domain (i.e., accommodation sharing) and drew on a
leading platform as a source (i.e., Airbnb). Previous
research has demonstrated that imported reputation is less
effective when source and target domains differ or when
the source platform is less reputable (Teubner et al. 2020).
Finally, we only considered numerical ratings. Previous
research, however, has demonstrated a strong impact of
(positive) text reviews for economic and social value
expectations on platforms when compared to other trustbuilding artifacts (Abramova et al. 2017; Dann et al. 2020).
Hence, future research should investigate which forms of
online reputation are particularly helpful for promoting
trust across platform boundaries.
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